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The Economic Crisis and the Reshaping of Geography
Jürgen Oßenbrügge
Die Wirtschaftskrise und die Umgestaltung der Geographie
An exploration of roots and effects of the recent economic and fiscal crisis reveals temporal
and spatial characteristics which are used in this paper in order to discuss concepts and
explanations from Economic Geography. In general, we may observe a transformation of Wes-
tern economy and society which, labeled as financialisation, has increasingly structured spatial
development on different scales recently. The paper explores (a) more systematically when,
where and to what extent geographical elements accelerate crisis developments. These arguments
build on the theoretical explanation brought forward by David Harvey and the French regulation
school. These insights form (b) a background for arguments for an economic geography of
“glocal” crisis in order to improve our explanatory abilities. Strong geographical components
become obvious in the causes of the subprime crisis – an issue which reflects the ways the
built environment is organised. Furthermore, effects of the crisis reinforce processes of uneven
development on both international and sub-national scales.
 1. Introduction
Talking about crises of the financial and economic
system these days, headlines, experiences and
processes come to mind which include serious
shocks, strong turbulences, substantial devalua-
tions and structural changes of the financial
system and the economy as a whole. In contrast
to earlier financial crises which were bound to
certain regional settings (e.g. Mexico 1994,
Asia 1997, Russia 1998) the recent disturbances
have demonstrated an outreach on a world
scale. Since the beginning of 2007/08, crisis
phenomena within different segments of the
economy conjoined in a highly dynamic fash-
ion leading to complex and far-reaching effects.
All these dramatic changes within a short time pe-
riod have led to a variety of research inquiries for
economic geographers and the social scientists.
Some are addressed in the following chapters,
which have a provisional character for at least two
reasons: First, our academic ability to approach
crisis phenomena from a perspective within eco-
nomic geography is restricted. There is a broad
debate whether the social and economic sciences
as a whole have been misguided in the last years
because these disciplines have missed early warn-
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ing signs that a crisis might occur and have failed
to give sufficient explanations. The same holds
true for Economic Geography, even though the
relationship between economic structures and
processes on the one hand and political interests
and conflicts on the other hand are a common sub-
ject of our discipline. Most of the authors who
have already given comments and delivered papers
on topics about the recent crisis complain about
deficits and conceptual blind spots. The condition
of the ‘geography of finance’ is seen as being
poorly developed and it has been stated that there
is no ‘geography of economic crisis’ (Martin
2011, Schamp 2011). Without debating why these
disciplinary shortfalls have evolved in detail, we
should look for heterodox building blocks which
might be helpful to get a better understanding of
recent events. Second, our empirical insights to
roots, driving forces and consequences of the cri-
sis are still weak and partly opaque. Of course these
deficiencies illustrate the ‘nature’ of especially this
crisis, its complexity and outreach as well as its
sometimes surprising victims. This leads to de-
mands to write about the crisis in a descriptive way,
to outline geographical narratives which help to un-
derstand ongoing processes in more detail. French
et al. (2009: 289) call this “near-event description”
which is seen as appropriate because the results are
still unfolding (similar Langley 2008: 5).
According to these preliminary thoughts, the pa-
per is divided into three sections. In the beginning,
crisis phenomena and the debate about causes,
research perspectives and examples of general
explanations are outlined. Without intending to
review the narratives about the economic crisis
comprehensively (see Castree 2010), those fea-
tures are highlighted which are of geographical
importance. Some particular geographies of the
crisis are presented in the second section with
special reference to the urban roots of the crisis.
This is an exercise to combine a relational ‘glocali-
sation’ argument with a territorialised multi-level
perspective in order to permit a synthesis between
global-local interplays and geo-economic power
games. Finally, further research tasks are elabo-
rated in order to overcome the present situation
which is unsatisfactory not only from an
academic but also from a political perspective.
2.  Global Economic Crisis: End of the
Finance-Dominated Accumulation Regime?
2.1 Crisis phenomena and research questions
Though economic crises are phenomena which
occur ‘overnight’ without being anticipated by
the majority of the actors involved, they usually
have a particular history. If we look at the recent
crisis in a chronological perspective we may de-
limitate periods where different drivers have
accelerated risks and have led to synergetic and
powerful effects. In so doing, it becomes possi-
ble to underline specific features of the crisis
which will be used subsequently to outline re-
search perspectives which may guide us in order
to answer the question whether processes of fi-
nancialisation, which will be described in the next
section, have structured the global economy in
the last decades, and if so, will they be changed
gradually or fundamentally in the future.
Four features will be highlighted here which
should be included in further reasoning: (1) the
microeconomic and urban roots of the fiscal cri-
sis; (2) the global outreach of the crisis and inter-
nal dynamics within the financial system; (3) the
relationship between the financial and the ‘real’
economic sector, and (4) the relationship between
the state and the financial sector.
(1) The origins of the present global turbulences
are not only, but predominantly, ‘made in the
USA’. They were formed by a complex inter-
action between a politics of ‘cheap money’ on
the one hand and a boom of residential invest-
ment on the other hand. Between 2001 and
2003 federal prime rates dropped from 6.5 %
to 1 % in the USA in order to stimulate eco-
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nomic activities after the dot-com crisis and
the 9/11 downturn. Among other causes, this
led to a further increase in mortgage lending
of private households stimulating a demand-
driven economic upswing. Because house-
holds could rely on rising home prices in or-
der to refinance their mortgages, at least until
2006, the boom continued though prime rates
rose again by up to 5 % between 2004 and
2007. In this period the first signs of the be-
ginning of a crisis became obvious and the first
warnings had been put forward announcing that
credit and finance institutions inside the USA
would face major problems. In 2007 the so-
called subprime crisis took off when the home
price index began to drop sharply.
(2) In 2008 the possible collapse of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, two of the most important
mortgage lenders in the U.S. and, greater
still, the breakdown of the investment bank
Lehman Brothers & Co marked the begin-
ning of the ‘hot period’ of the present cri-
sis. The problems of the housing market and
deriving effects on mortgage lending led to
dramatic effects on the trade of derivatives
with major turbulences and devaluations for
various financial institutions. Furthermore,
the serious situation of Citigroup, which still
is one of the biggest U.S. commercial banks
and a so-called systemically important finan-
cial institution, reflects the growing problems
of the ‘credit card economy’, revealing that
not only the credits of home owners were at
risk but also consumption credits in general.
The ‘European experience’ of the crisis set
in during the summer of 2007 when the Ger-
man IKB (Internationale Kreditbank) and
Sachsen LB (Sächsische Landesbank),
Northern Rock in the UK and UBS in Switzer-
land were faced with major problems due to
their intensive investment in ‘toxic assets’
of American asset-backed securities, some-
times leading to insolvency or takeover by
other parties or even by the state.
(3) Due to the credit crunch, the decline of con-
sumer demands and the growing general un-
certainty of the financial sector, the crisis
overflowed into the ‘real’ economy in early
2009 starting with a sharp decline of export-
driven activities, e.g., in Germany or China. A
temporary downturn of prices for raw mate-
rials followed which included strong effects
on resource based economies in developing
countries. The substantial decline of the trans-
port sector caused major problems, e.g., in
port areas. Even more, the crisis accelerated
already existing problems in the automotive
industries and its supply chains. The financial
crisis turned into a general economic crisis.
(4) Finally, at the time of writing, the crisis has
forced the international community to sup-
port certain states, like Greece, because of
their growing debt issues. Iceland, Ireland,
Portugal, Spain, Italy, the UK and others are
faced with similar troubles. The discussion
in the U.S. concerning budget deficits and
how to overcome debt problems as well as
the European debate about the future of the
Euro in the face of asymmetries between
economic strong member states, like
Germany, and weak ones in the southern
fringe characterise the present situation as
a wide-ranging debate about re-regulation
of the financial system on both the national
and the global scale. Three years after the
outbreak, the financial system is still in a
volatile and crisis-driven condition.
Though financial and economic crises may be seen
as a common feature of capitalist market econo-
mies, the impacts of recent turbulences seem to
be much stronger and indicate fundamental prob-
lems as well as the beginning of structural trans-
formations. Perhaps there is a certain metropoli-
tan bias in this perception because the U.S. and the
European economies have been affected the most
(Oke 2009). But these regions still contain the
majority of economic assets and a crisis in this
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centre of global business would be expected to
have structural impacts all over the world.
If we are to summarise the recent events in or-
der to derive research tasks for the social sci-
ences in general and Geography in particular,
the following topics must be highlighted. First,
looking at the crisis, it has become clear that
there are highly complex interactions within the
finance system which are not (fully) understood
by the economic and political actors involved,
especially in respect to their inherent crisis
potentials. Deeper insights into the global
finance system are necessary in order to under-
stand recent changes. Second, the dynamics of
the crisis reveals strong dependencies between
the financial and the productive sectors which
are strongly interconnected and where the lat-
ter seems to be dependent on the former. The
terms ‘finance-dominated accumulation regime’
or the shorter ‘financialisation’ (Tabb 2010,
French et al. 2011) are used here in order to
underline the importance and structure that the
power of the finance system has in relation to
other economic sectors and everyday life. This
implies that today a financial crisis is automati-
cally a general economic crisis.
Third, an important result of the crisis has been
the reappearance of the state within economic
markets. The financial and regulatory power of
the state, which was at least partly put aside
under neoliberal hegemony, is back on stage in
order to ‘rescue’ the capitalist market economy.
This will inevitably lead to a new interpretation
of the relationship between the state and the pri-
vate sector. Crucial fields of interaction are the
intervention and regulation of currencies and debt
policies. Especially the eurozone is confronted
with new experiences on how to deal with in-
equalities and asymmetric patterns within the new
currency community. Moreover, questions of glo-
bal geo-economic relations, which are mirrored
in currency markets especially between Dollar,
Euro and Yen, have been put on the agenda.
Fourth, taking the antecedents of the crisis into
account, certain features of micro-macroeconomic
interaction have come to light which have been
labeled “residential capitalism” (Schwartz and Sea-
brooke 2008) and ‘privatised Keynesianism’
(Crouch 2009) and which address a form of devel-
opment that Harvey has called a ‘spatial fix’ in or-
der to establish a Post-Fordist structural coherence.
To put it differently: Geography matters obviously
in both directions, to reveal the causal mechanism
and to differentiate effects of the crisis. The crisis
has revealed strong global-local tensions, thus il-
lustrating that we have to build upon so-called ‘glo-
cal’ perspectives, especially in Geography. The
origins of the recent crisis are to a remarkable ex-
tent based in local housing affairs. Furthermore,
those processes which could be called ‘the going
global of local mortgage financing’ or the ‘micro-
globalisation of finance’ (Dymski 2005) might
reveal important features of the crisis dynamics.
These distinct forms of local-global interplay are
embedded in a multi-level political organisation of
space which includes different outreaches of po-
litical actors and respective different interests and
regulative capacities. While the term ‘glocalisa-
tion’ highlights the global network character of the
crisis in relational perspective, the subdivisions of
political space ranging from global to local modes
of governance emphasise the territorial dimension
of political reaction and intervention.
These topics form promising research questions
from a geographical perspective in order to
advance a disciplinary viewpoint of the roots,
dynamics and outcomes of the global economic
crisis. Of course this is not a stand-alone proper-
ty of the discipline but should be embedded in a
general frame of recent capitalist development.
2.2 The crisis of the finance-dominated
accumulation regime
Despite the sceptical views of various authors
concerning a ‘crisis-blind’ discipline, there was a
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remarkable tradition of research in the late 1970s
and 1980s within the social sciences and Eco-
nomic Geography which tried to understand the
crisis of Fordism. Topics of economic restruc-
turing, regional and urban crisis as well as their
political implications were common research
fields at that time (examples are Fröbel et al.
1981, Carney et al. 1980, Mayer et al. 1978).
This body of literature emerged in the face of
different but related events and shifts, like e.g. the
oil-price shock, rising unemployment rates in
highly industrialised economies, the break-down
of the Bretton Woods system and pressures of in-
flation, the cut-backs of the Keynesian welfare
state, the shift to neoliberal ideologies and the
rise of the social-ecological movement. A broad
variety of crisis phenomena formed a new basis
for conceptual thinking in political and econom-
ic geography. Perhaps we are at a starting point
of a similar wave right now.
In these early contributions to crisis phenomena
a cyclical conception of history was often used
which interprets crisis as a recurrent phenome-
non and as a period of fundamental transforma-
tions. Such a mode of thinking requires some
theoretical underpinning of concepts related to
stability and abrupt change which leads us to the
long and controversial debate over time-space
relation in Economic History and Geography
(Wallerstein 1998). Without going into a more
detailed reflection here (Jessop 2001, Oßen-
brügge 2008), some attention should be given to
the debate about long waves in the world econo-
my. Based on observations of cyclical move-
ments in the capitalist economy Nicolai Kondra-
tieff put forward the idea of ‘great cycles’ or ‘long
waves’ which last up to 40 or 60 years. The Kon-
dratieff cycles have become a common, often
heuristically used concept in, for example, Eco-
nomic History (Braudel, Wallerstein), neomar-
xist Political Economy (Mandel, Kleinknecht),
regulation theory (Aglietta, Boyer, Lipietz) as
well as Political and Economic Geography
(Taylor, Agnew, Knox).
A prominent narrative in this discussion is marked
by the transformation from Fordism to Post-
Fordism. Within the last two decades much has
been written about these changes; sometimes with
strong links to regulation theory and neighbour-
ing concepts (social systems of accumulation,
varieties of capitalism; Jessop and Sum 2006,
Kotz and McDonough 2010) which forms one of
the conceptual platforms of institutional Econom-
ic Geography today. The literature covers prima-
rily: a) new organisational modes as alternatives
or modifications to Fordist production, e.g., the
debate about industrial districts, clusters, science-
based economies or innovation systems; b) the new
role of politics and the function of the state in glo-
balisation processes, e.g., the competition state,
‘de-statism’ or new governance modes; and c) the
characteristics and spatial organisation of the fi-
nance sector but with only little reference to its
structural power to influence economic activities
in general, e.g., finance geography and the world
city system, organisational aspects of the finance
industry, the relationship between unbounded
money flows and regional development.
Though this research has accumulated far-
reaching knowledge about a multitude of new,
transformed and restructured forms of capital-
ism in Economic Geography, the dominating
role of the financial system was not reflected
seriously (for exceptions, see Corbridge et al.
1994, Clark 2005, Klagge 2009). Periodical-
ly, the macro-conditions of the financial system
have been discussed but this did not guide em-
pirical work in a consistent and systematic way.
The relationship between the growing finance
systems with the so-called ‘real’ economy and
its spatial implications have remained unex-
plored to a large extent, perhaps with the excep-
tion of the shareholder value concept and its
impact on restructuring processes of companies
listed at the stock exchange (Froud et al. 2000).
Consequently, the same holds true for the risks
deriving from turbulences of the financial sec-
tor. As we have seen, some research is being
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carried out regarding the recent crisis and its
enormous impacts. In any case, this paper is a plea
that these questions will become a major research
task in the future, looking out for promising start-
ing points. In so doing we should consider in more
detail the long wave which started at the end of the
1960s and ended recently.
An interpretation of the recent crisis is offered
here, which follows regulationist thinkers like
Boyer (2000) and Aglietta (2000). The basic
question is whether the events between 2007 and
2009 mark an end of the formative period of the
‘finance-dominated accumulation regime’
(FDAR) or of ‘global neoliberalism’ (Kotz and
McDonough 2010). This system evolved as a
new mode of capitalism out of the crisis of Ford-
ism in the late sixties and early seventies; Ford-
ism had been dominant since the end of World
War II. The period of Fordism depended on com-
binatory effects like the redistribution of produc-
tivity gains through the wage system which, in
turn, secured the purchasing power and the demand
for industrial products by households. Further-
more, the combination of mass production and
mass consumption was embedded into both an ac-
tive state which used Keynesian interventions and
a pronounced social welfare system.
The Fordist mode of accumulation came under
growing pressure in the late 1960s due to the oil
crisis, profit squeeze and organisational lock-ins.
Big companies started far-reaching restructur-
ing programs which were accelerated and pushed
by early neoconservative and neoliberal agendas of
prominent political leaders like Ronald Reagan in
the US or Margaret Thatcher in the UK. The de-
regulation of institutionalised work relationships,
the undermining of the political positions of trade
unions and the establishment of a new internation-
al division of labour were characteristic topics of
this transformative period (Roth 2009).
In addition, in the 1970s the international money
system experienced profound changes. After
World War II the Bretton Woods system, which
proposed a gold-dollar exchange standard, formed
the financial basis of Fordism in the Western
world in which the USA and its money politics had
a hegemonic role (Strange 1986). The final
breakdown of the gold standard in 1973 and fur-
ther operations led to various problems, e.g. in-
flation – not only in the developed world but in
the underdeveloped world, too. A new geography
of international finance emerged, e.g., the Petro-
dollar and the Euro banking phenomena, and
profit-seeking capital moved to states of the Third
World. Confronted with ongoing crises of the na-
tional and the international money system, a so-
called ‘monetarism’ came up which included high
interest rates, tight money supply and fluctuat-
ing exchange rates. These attempts to re-regu-
late the system led to the debt crisis in the de-
veloping world because the money which had
flowed to the global South in the late 1970s and
early 1980s at floating interests rates became li-
able for repayment at high real interest rates
(Corbridge 1993). Additionally, policies of
structural adjustment controlled and implement-
ed by the International Monetary Fond (IMF)
‘disciplined’ development strategies in favour of
international markets and metropolitan creditors.
While in this way the global periphery experienced
a financial subordination by international agen-
cies, the international money system in the West-
ern world was transformed in a market-led way,
where state interventions were still operating in
order to resolve national payment disequilibria.
This includes geo-economic regulation systems
like the emergence of regional ‘money powers’
like Japan and the Yen zone in East Asia or Ger-
many and the DM zone in Central Europe. And
there were other important factors relevant to
understand the present situation: the upswing of
the financial economy itself based on deregula-
tion of national institutions, the availability of
venture capital, the creation of new financial
markets through the process of securitisation,
the rise of institutional investors and the percep-
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tion that stock markets were the most impor-
tant economic indicator both for growth and for
the need to intervene in markets (Corbridge et
al. 1994). Another important driving force was
the invention of new forms of risk management:
“After the final collapse of Bretton Woods …
the financial business was confronted with new
uncertainties. It was not only the exchange rate
volatility that increased dramatically but, as the
liberalisation of capital movements pro-
gressed, investors also started to look at oppor-
tunities offered by financial markets abroad.
Accordingly, a demand for effective hedging
and arbitrage instruments developed which can
be used for protection from, as well as specu-
lation with, risks. What these instruments have
in common is that they are based on the anti-
cipation of future developments and, to some
extent, make the expectations of expectations
tradable” (Strulik 2006: 11).
This transformation from a Fordist accumula-
tion system towards a finance-dominated one
was described by, among others, Michel Agli-
etta, whose analysis of the Fordist mode of
regulation in the US, published in 1976, may be
seen as one of the groundbreaking works in
regulation theory. Nearly thirty years later he
outlined important features of the new accumu-
lation regime and gave clear expectations as to
what might happen. In his view, increasing risks
are not only a possible outcome of the FDAR,
but a systemic component which will grow in
time. That is to say that the new FDAR has led
to an emergence of intermediating financial
organisations and a significant employment
growth. Furthermore, the extension of financial
products which are offered in new markets have
created an autonomous field of competition,
speculation and profit-making within this sector
without significant feedback loops to productive
sectors. Finally, the FDAR is also restructuring
economic activities on the corporate level lead-
ing to the shareholder value strategy and on the
private level with growing consumer credits.
In this way a complex network of dependencies
has emerged with new modes of product stand-
ardisation and expectations toward increasing
returns – often ‘out of nothing’. The enormous
extension of the securitisation business and the
extraordinary increase of trade with derivatives
are indicators of this change. Whereas in earlier
times business banks handled credits more or less
‘indoor’ with their clients without offering them
to other financial organisations, today financial
risks are divided into basic elements. These are
transferred into special investment vehicles which
allow trading and which become a new source for
growth and profit. Within this process organisa-
tional limits of the bank business are blurred and
other actors enter the financial market. Step by
step microeconomic innovations have trans-
formed macroeconomic structures and institu-
tions: a multitude of financial dependencies be-
tween different organisations in different coun-
tries in different financial markets on different
scales. The strife for profit and speculative expec-
tations have led to the globalisation of the money
system in a way which has penetrated the strate-
gies and operational aims of companies, states and
the everyday life of private households (Aglietta
2000, similarly Huffschmid 1999, Windolf 2005).
Finally, the diffusion of the FDAR, which can
only be touched on here with some general ar-
guments, has led to a changing role and growing
income inequalities of private households. On
the one hand, the earnings of the majority of
employees could realise only a little or moder-
ate growth of income often below inflation
whereas on the other hand asset owners and the
employees of the so-called FIRE sector gained
significantly from the growth of the finance
economy. Langley (2008: 2) presents interest-
ing figures showing that the proportion of private
households participating in the stock market in
the US rose from 3 % in 1930 to about 25 % in
1987 and up to 52 % in 2001. This indicates a dif-
fusion of the finance system and reveals that, in
the meantime, the process of financialisation
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incorporates not only the professional FIRE sec-
tor, but includes a relevant share of the society.
What seems to be even more interesting related
to the credit crunch is the observation that de-
velopment enforced a ‘privatised Keynesianism’
(Crouch 2009, Young 2011) with an enormous
rise of mortgage and consumer credits in econ-
omies like the US and the UK. One could even
argue that this ‘democratisation of finance’
(Langley) has been a necessary condition for
the successful empowerment of the FDAR.
Such hypotheses have to be further elaborated
and evaluated than it is possible here, but we
should keep in mind that this requires a better un-
derstanding of the various features of the finance
system like “the intersection between changes in
the capital markets, on the one hand, and trans-
formations in everyday spaces, practices and
identities on the other” (Langley 2008: 7).
Within regulationist thinking this view is espe-
cially challenging because the strength of this
theory lies in macro-level interpretations of the
national scale in relation to global economic
changes. Though the concept of regulation im-
plies a self-organised reproduction of practices
leading to a certain stability of the accumulation
regime (Danielzyk and Oßenbrügge 2001, Jes-
sop and Sum 2006), the tools to analyse the re-
lationship between structure and agency are as
weak as those which take the relationship be-
tween micro and macro conditions into account.
To move beyond these restrictions there are
promising conceptual proposals which are de-
rived from actor-network theory and governmen-
tality studies. Those authors who work with the
everyday life of global finance, like Langley,
Mackenzie and others, have explored the ways
the FDAR has integrated ordinary people and
penetrated investment decisions by private
households. ANT tells us something about the
diffusion and growing spatial outreach of the fi-
nancial system based on new forms of socio-
technical interaction (Berndt 2011). Combined
with the neo-institutionalist concept of isomor-
phic learning and adaptation one can realise how
rules of deal-making and risk evaluation have
spread across the globe, including the underscor-
ing of financial dangers. As Haldane – a lead-
ing manager of the Bank of England – empha-
sised: “Until recently, mathematical models of
finance pointed to the stabilising effects of fi-
nancial network completeness. Connectivity
meant risk dispersion. Real-world experience
appeared to confirm that logic. Between 1997
and 2007, buffeted by oil prices shocks, wars and
dotcom mania, the financial system stood tall; it
appeared self-regulating and self-repairing. The
past 18 months have revealed a system which has
shown itself to be neither self-regulating nor
self-repairing. Like the rain forest, when faced
with a big shock, the financial system has at times
risked becoming non-renewable” (Haldane
2009: 9, quoted in French et al. 2011: 16).
In conclusion, one might argue that those forms
of financial networks which emerged in the last
decades are responsible for the crisis. In contrast
to the common perception which assumes that
decentralised networks obtain resilient character-
istics against booms and busts the recent crisis
has revealed that the contrary is the case. A deeper
understanding of the actors and networks is
therefore a necessary precondition for further
theorising. Moreover, Langley’s  conceptual
themes are convincing, i.e. what he calls ‘finan-
cial power, identity and dissent’ and which are
based in Foucauldian thinking in order to explain
the social acceptance of the neoliberal FDAR and
the broad participation in financial transactions.
In a simplified way one could argue that the FDAR
runs smoothly only under the condition that it is
broadly accepted in social arrangements as well
as practiced in everyday financial transactions.
This includes a willingness and interest to partic-
ipate in financial affairs as well as a subordination
under rules of this sector and, in so doing, to le-
gitimise this ‘financial way of life’. Therefore
processes of a ‘neoliberal subjectivisation’ have
been in operation which illustrate that the FDAR
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is not a system ‘out there’, uncoupled of every-
day social relations, but a growing component of
everyday practices. Conceptualised in this way
the financial crisis is not only an economic bust,
but a crisis also of identities and social stability.
3. Urban Roots of the Financial Crisis
From the general background presented in the
previous section, roots of the financial crisis will
be analysed focusing on perspectives of Social
and Economic Geography. In so doing, two dif-
ferent views are important. The first one intends
to link the local to the global level, e.g. when we
take the practice of subprime lending and the
mortgage market, especially in the US, into ac-
count. This perspective on the micro level illus-
trates the way hopes and desires of private
households and ordinary people have been
incorporated into the FDAR on a macro level.
Based on financial innovations leading to new
investment vehicles, the multitude of individual
actions has been the raw material for profit seek-
ing of financial actors throughout the globe. That
means that “an understanding of the mortgage
crisis and the credit crunch is ultimately a spatia-
lised understanding of the linkages between lo-
cal and global, between space of places and spaces
of flows” (Aalbers 2009a: 34, similarly Clark 2005
and Martin 2011). In contrast to this bottom-up
perspective the second one is more top-down and
links the global to the local level on the background
of structural relations, geo-economic competition
and power. This includes the actors and their net-
works within the financial system and looks at
global cities which serve as local innovation cen-
tres of financial opportunities and risks.
3.1 Subprime lending, mortgage claims
and foreclosures
Recently there have been reports in newspapers
that several state institutions within the US, e.g.
offices of justice, the general attorneys and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
which overlooks interactions at the stock ex-
change are investigating into bank activities
which are seen as having been responsible for the
outbreak of the crisis before 2008 (Henkel
2010). In the centre of juristic interest is the trad-
ing of such ‘collateralised debt obligations’
(CDO) which are derivatives of building mort-
gages or even synthetic obligations of these de-
rivatives. CDOs have enabled financial actors to
incorporate the dynamics of the residential and
commercial housing markets into global finan-
cial circuits. The growth of the US mortgage
market has been estimated from US $ 35 billion
in 1994 up to over US $ 600 billion in 2006
(Avery in Aalbers 2009a: 36). Through the prac-
tice of bundling and securitising mortgage loans
to so-called ‘residential mortgage-backed secu-
rities’ (RMBS) lenders of money were able to
create a second mortgage market and collect
fresh money in order to offer it to satisfy the in-
creasing credit demands of potential homeown-
ers. In this way the creation of an urbanised land-
scape and the creation of a bubble economy went
hand in hand, organised by a variety of actors, but
especially by banks and rating institutions that have
been responsible for this mortgage-based specu-
lative financial market. One outcome in Califor-
nia is well described by Burkhalter and Castells:
“Entire metropolitan and suburban areas, especial-
ly along the sunbelt, were built as giant Ponzi
schemes. These places never offered anything else
other than the promise of profit. Profit to the de-
velopers and the banks first and foremost, and
profit to the contractors, the builders, the loan
brokers, lenders, real estate agents and home buy-
ers and sellers. Other than the now busted prom-
ise of instant profit these vast spans of new homes
sprawling in a boundless territory had no raison
d’être. They brought no quality of life to the indi-
viduals that dwelled in them, yet downgraded the
quality of the existing cities, diluted infrastructural
resources and most of all, destroyed the environ-
ment” (Burkhalter and Castells 2009).
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Geography obviously matters, both as cause and
effect of the financial crisis. It is, therefore, rea-
sonable to have a closer look at the subprime and
mortgage crisis in order to reveal the links be-
tween local production of urban space and the
global credit crunch (Aalbers 2009b).
The relationships between housing and mortgage
credits may be divided into two different but
interconnected aspects. The first one points to
the practice of subprime lending which has a
longer crisis-ridden tradition. Subprime lending
is directed to motivate those groups to take over
credits for housing in which financial vulnerabil-
ity is obviously high. “Over a trillion dollars was
channelled into the sub-prime mortgage market,
which is comprised of the poorest and least credit
worth borrowers within the United States”
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2008: 12). High-cost re-
finance loans are common and satisfy profit ex-
pectations of the financial institutions. The term
‘predatory lending’ is used to characterise this
kind of financial exploitation of the urban under-
class of Black or Hispanic Americans (Wyly et
al. 2009). Problems occur when the economic
situation of homeowners comes under stress due
to regional economic decline, growing unem-
ployment and downward movement of housing
prices. These had been typical problems of the
‘rustbelt’ already in 1997/98. In 2004/05 a re-
markable rise of foreclosures could be observed
in cities like Detroit indicating a possible crisis
to come. According to Harvey (2011) this has
been broadly neglected within expert circles and
the media because it was seen or defined as a prob-
lem of a marginal group on the credit market.
The spatial distribution of subprime lending re-
veals a strong correlation between urban margin-
ality and predatory lending practices. But the
mortgage crisis was also fed by a second proc-
ess. In the years before the crisis a growing
housing market based on credits at risk evolved
in the US sunbelt, esp. in Florida, California,
Arizona and Nevada. This implied an enormous
boost of credit supply for the middle classes.
Small interest rates compared to increasing prices
for houses led to huge investments and demands
for mortgages, creating new urbanised land-
scapes as described by Burkhalter and Castells
(see also Hesse 2008). The symbiosis between
the need for a home on the one hand and the pro-
duction of a home as an interesting capital in-
vestment on the other hand have been at the roots
of the recent crisis on the household level illus-
trating a concrete form of Harvey’s concept of
urbanisation of capital (Harvey 1985). Similar
processes were operating outside the US, too,
for instance in Ireland or Spain. Furthermore, pri-
vately owned houses are an important asset for
large groups of the population in Western socie-
ties, and rising house prices have been at least
partly responsible for overcoming the dot-com
and 9/11 economic bust (The Economist 28/03/
2002). Some authors even argue that a concept of
residential capitalism, which puts housing poli-
cies, property rights or housing finance systems
into the centre of the analysis, is able to explain a
lot of variation of welfare distribution in North
America and Europe (Schwartz and Seabrooke
2008). But it would be a misunderstanding to re-
gard the micro-level of housing and individual
mortgage demands or even housing policies on a
macro-level as the key to an understanding of the
global crisis. The crucial question is: Where did
the huge amounts of capital come from which
were necessary in order to satisfy the demand for
mortgage and to build the suburban environments
which formed a precondition for the bubble?
Since lending for a growing mortgage market is
a very interesting business, actors in the finan-
cial market created new sources for attracting
capital. Housing markets were included as a new
segment of the FDAR through residential mort-
gage-backed securities (RMBS), real estate in-
vestment trusts (REIT) or other derivatives. The
process of standardisation through securitisation
opened up a secondary mortgage market which
spread over the world and offered mortgage lend-
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ers increasing returns. Securitisation as an act
to convert “opaque and illiquid assets into liquid
and transparent securities” (Gotham 2009: 357)
was the principal mechanism to incorporate lo-
cal property business into international capital
markets. In so doing, the immobile character of
private homes was transferred into an ex-
changeable, marketable and liquid commodity.
Money, now sourced on a global scale, could
be offered to potential homeowners at low in-
terest rates. In this way a built environment was
created which visualises the material form of
the international liquidity of money and its
strife for high returns on investment. Accord-
ingly, as the housing bubble burst, the crisis was
an international problem from the very begin-
ning. “Secondary mortgage markets are global
markets, which means that a crisis of mortgage
securitisation implies that investors around the
globe, and therefore economies around the
globe, are affected from Chinese sovereign
wealth funds to Dutch pension funds and from
Swiss investment banks to Norwegian munici-
palities” (Aalbers 2009b: 287).
3.2 Fordist accumulation
and FDAR suburbanisation
Though it sounds banal, it is important to note
that houses are material products with a lifespan
of decades. Because of this fact certain geo-
graphical forms of the finance crisis which are
related to the subprime and mortgage crisis will
be persistent. This is the case of housing and
urban extension. The production of suburban
landscapes was already an important compo-
nent of the Fordist regime of accumulation, be-
cause the process of suburbanisation in the fif-
ties and sixties had led to a combinatory effect
of mass production and mass consumption. The
construction of standardised housing schemes
in line with typical suburban consumption
norms based on an industrialisation of house-
hold work and car dependency had been a ma-
jor feature of those years. Furthermore, the
state invested huge amounts of money into pro-
grams such as the highway system to support
this Fordist way of life and to accelerate eco-
nomic growth in a Keynesian manner.
The subprime crisis reveals that these ‘old’ pat-
terns have continued to be in operation. The
strife for homeownership of the masses leading
to economies of scale was again a starting point
for huge investments into the housing market.
But this time the spatial fix was not included in
such a type of accumulation in which the rela-
tionship between capital owners and the produc-
tivity gains of the employees had at least partly
been balanced. On the contrary, under the FDAR,
suburbanisation is a form of redistributive growth
and, to follow Tabb (2010) who applies arguments
delivered by Harvey (2007), a kind of ‘accumula-
tion by dispossession’ of those who subscribed
to the lending offers, which was typical for sub-
prime lending, or of those who are now paying
the costs of the credit crunch worldwide. In this
way the logic of the financial system, where money
is not a medium to facilitate the exchange of goods
and services but has become a commodity itself,
is still strongly interlinked with ‘real’ persons and
with the material world in the form of urban space.
Modern processes of suburbanisation are expres-
sions of a bubble economy built on dreams al-
ready created in the Fordist era. The financial
system and those who deal with money as a com-
modity have demonstrated in which way illiquid,
spatially fixed assets may be transformed into
fluid ones in order to raise returns of investments
and how this money creates new urban space
(Gotham 2009, Dymski 2009).
3.3 Financial crisis, geo-economics
and the role of financial centres
In order to introduce the global-local link we may
use the results of judicial investigations again.
Two years after the outbreak of the mortgage de-
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rivatives crisis, actors and organisations of the
securitisation business are confronted today with
the accusation of having been active in heating
the markets of CDOs. Investment banks which
offered high-risk derivatives are accused of hav-
ing manipulated information and rating agencies
are blamed for their evaluation practices leading
to AAA scores of bad obligations. Furthermore,
it is investigated whether there has been an on-
going interchange of employees between finan-
cial businesses and rating agencies. Research
about creative milieus and territorial innovation
systems seems to show that spatial proximity
does matter. This underlines the argument that
the FDAR has further specific geographical
forms which may be uncovered if we look at lead-
ing financial centres like New York and London
and the financial managers located there or,
more generally, at deriving local and national va-
rieties of financial capitalism.
Though it has become rather obvious that the
FDAR is operating on a global scale through a
highly interconnected network of financial rela-
tionships, this does not mean that national differ-
ences or arguments emphasising the varieties on
the state level do not play a significant role. On
the contrary, one may assume with some plausi-
bility that dominant institutions in major nation
states show greater variation in the era of the
FDAR than in previous regimes (Kotz and Mc-
Donough 2010: 96). This argument points to
work relations, fiscal policies, welfare programs
and social control. Without going into a more de-
tailed discussion about the importance or even
predominance of the global versus a ‘national’
scale or vice versa it is worthwhile to consider
geo-economic variations and to look at the role
of financial centres before and during the crisis.
There is a longer history of geographical forms
of how to recycle money. The flow of the euro
and of the petrodollars in the late seventies and
early eighties and the resulting debt crisis of the
global South have already been mentioned. More
recent geo-economic dependencies include the role
and strategies of wealth funds coming from oil-
producing nations and Asian export-based econ-
omies. Specifically, the interdependencies be-
tween China and the USA have received special
attention. This relationship has ensured the Chi-
nese strategy of export-driven development on
the one hand, where the US market has played a
major role, and the use of the export income to
invest in US Treasury Bonds on the other hand,
which facilitates American credit-based con-
sumption habits. After the outbreak of the crisis
further geo-economic relations have become
obvious. Examples include national protection
against foreign banks which have collapsed, e.g.
in the case of Icelandic banks, or measures to
reduce the effects of CDS trade against indebt-
ed European economies in order to stabilise the
eurozone. Within the crises and their geo-
economic implications the nation-state reen-
tered the stage as an interventionist actor with
the demonstrative will to contain and hedge the
so-called ‘Masters of the Universe’. But this in-
terpretation remains superficial because it as-
sumes that the FDAR followed pure market
logic and did not have a political side. We pre-
fer the assumption that a successful regime is
always reflecting political powers and power
relations between opposing social groups,
movements and parties. Seen from this angle
the emergence of the FDAR and its institutions
includes and depends on state operations.
From a geographical perspective, financial cen-
tres come in at this point as clusters of experts
and influential ‘money movers.’ These centres
are places where the complexity of the global
financial system was invented and where the nar-
ratives about the advantages of this kind of eco-
nomic regulation had their major sources.
French et al. even argue that “the primary roots
of this crisis can be traced back to competition
between leading international financial centres
over a long period of time” (French et al. 2009:
290). This argument can rely on well-known
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research results of urban clusters because finan-
cial centres combine structural advantages
(quantity and size of financial organisation),
cognitive advantages (inventions and early intro-
duction of new financial products) and symbol-
ic advantages (opinion leadership capacity and
the location of media centres).
Whereas these centres are undoubtedly global
hubs of the financial systems and therefore nodes
in networks of money, abstracted from territory,
they are still embedded in national or regional
contexts. The term ‘Wall Street-Washington Cor-
ridor’ may serve as an example. It illustrates the
importance of the banking elite of New York for
the elaboration of US money policies (Johnson
2009). The same holds true for London and the
UK, Frankfurt and Germany, Tokyo and Japan. In
this way geo-economic competition structures
the role of the respective financial centre whereas
national financial interests are at least partly a re-
flection of the power of ‘their’ urban financial cen-
tres. This is another geographical component of
the FDAR which should be researched in more
detail in order to figure out the inherent politics
of scale and the role of single urban centres for
defining money policies (Schamp 2009).
4. Future Research Questions
There are already very different implications and
observable effects which may re-stimulate geo-
graphical research on crisis phenomena and, in so
doing, take up the academic tradition of the 1980s.
Respective research efforts will hopefully clear up
the nature and form of the recent crisis in more
detail. But besides a deeper understanding and
better theoretical insight, it would be of high value
to focus on different crisis outcomes using
approaches which are called ‘near-event descrip-
tion’. It is easy to justify this exercise because the
crisis and its implications are still unfolding
(French et al. 2009: 289). Some examples may
illustrate an outline of such a research program.
a) Because subprime lending stands at the root
of the recent global crisis it is important to ad-
dress the socio-spatial impact on its victims. For
example, what happened to those homeowners
who were affected by the downward movement
of house prices and upward movement of inter-
est rates, or whose inability to pay the mortgage
loans resulted in forced migration? We should
continue and intensify existing research which is
directed at subprime and predatory lending. This
research is strongly linked to questions of social,
racial and gender inequalities in the housing and
credit market (Wyly et al. 2009). Because the
practice of subprime lending has not been bound
to the territory of the USA but has led to precar-
ious housing booms in other world regions as
well (García 2010), this topic is related to trans-
national perspectives about accumulation by dis-
possession (Harvey 2007, Tabb 2010), which
should include those small investors who bought
recommended papers without knowing their
speculative nature. Furthermore, the urban form
is at question because the credit crunch is an ur-
ban and suburban crisis, too. What perspectives do
we have for speculatively built-up areas? Which
ideas and concepts do we offer in order to trans-
form these towards a more sustainable develop-
ment? Within the financial system there is the
motto ‘too big to fail’ in order to legitimise state
intervention. We should ask what this may mean
in relation to urban forms created in boom times.
But we should not concentrate on suburban
housing markets exclusively in order to explain
the roots of the recent crisis from a geograph-
ical standpoint. A recent report of the ‘Congres-
sional Oversight Panel’ emphasises the risks
coming from credit schemes for inner-urban
residential and commercial housing invest-
ments. There is a latent danger of growing fore-
closures and a further credit crunch of some
billions of US dollars. As it had been the case
with RMBS for suburban lending, ‘commercial
mortgage-backed securities’ (CMBS) exist as
special investment vehicles containing office
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buildings, shopping centres and hotels in US
cities and elsewhere (Pitzke 2010). Though it
is yet to be seen which problem will be attached
to these speculative activities, it is clear that the
diffusion of the crisis is still uncovering new
aspects of the urban financial problem.
b) A second perspective is related to labour
market problems as a result of the crisis where
different topics have come up. Because the
credit crunch has fierce implications on urban
labour markets especially within the FIRE sec-
tor, e.g., the breakdown of companies, sudden
dismissals and growing job insecurity, the ques-
tion of urban economic development is emerg-
ing. At the outbreak of the crisis this was a
prominent topic in the mass media. But the pic-
ture is far from clear. Richard Florida argues,
for example, that global financial centres will
finally be a winner of the credit crisis: “With
the hegemony of the investment banker over,
New York now stands a better chance of avoid-
ing that sterile fate” (Florida 2009: 7). Big and
talent-attracting places will benefit from the
crisis because the economy will shift to idea-
driven, creative industries during and after the
crisis. Despite acute and highly visible prob-
lems Florida promotes dense and vibrant plac-
es as cores of the future economic landscape.
Consequently, he argues against suburbanisation
and housing schemes in the countryside: “The
solution (of the crisis, J.O.) begins with the
removal of homeownership from its long-
privileged place at the centre of the U.S. econ-
omy” (Florida 2009: 16) and consequently he
advocates for better rental markets in cities.
Though this optimistic perspective does have
certain evidence in its favour, growing financial
problems of cities are to be expected leading
to dramatic cut-backs of social and cultural
achievements and even those amenities which
Florida and others believe are the most impor-
tant locational advantages for the creative econ-
omy. Moreover, labour market problems and re-
gional employment crises have followed the
credit crunch. Even in Germany this has become
obvious in export-specialised regions and trans-
port hubs in the last years, and in the future econ-
omies in more peripheral regions are expected
to be the losers of the crisis (ARL 2010).
c) We have already outlined the geo-economic
dimensions of the crisis including the global city
network. In general, new dynamics, power shifts
and disparities on different scales are likely to
emerge. At the global level this will lead towards
a redefinition of the US’s hegemonic position
and its ability to receive credits to counteract
current account deficits. Within this context the
future position of China and Asian economic per-
formance will be a crucial factor. A shift away
from American and European power centres, fa-
vouring Asian global cities as command centres
could reinforce tendencies towards a more
multi-polar world with disputed hegemonic
claims. But we should be aware that crisis-led
development will destabilise geopolitical rela-
tions and affect international relations not only
within the financial system.
d) A further chapter of near-event description
should be directed towards the role of the state
on the local, national and international levels.
From a superficial perspective the state has put
itself on stage as the remaining organisation
which is able and capable of acting towards a
regulation of the crisis. This has led to the po-
sition that the term ‘neoliberalism’ as the char-
acterising description of the state concept with-
in the FDAR is no longer accurate. The realign-
ment of decision-making power away from au-
tonomous financial actors and towards state in-
stitutions implies a reassessment of political
control leading not only to a ‘strong’ state,
which would be in line with conservative and
liberal ideologies, but also to a ‘big’ state which
is more linked to social-democratic and fur-
ther left thinking. Due to the implication of
recent state intervention, especially due to the
growing debts, the question of distributive jus-
2011/4                   The Economic Crisis and the Reshaping of Geography                     371
tice will emerge in a mid-term perspective. Per-
haps a rather paradoxical situation may come up:
The state, which has shown its strength and in-
terventionist power during the last months, will
be driven by debt payments to serve those obli-
gations in order not to let the existing accumu-
lation regime collapse. Perhaps global neo-
liberalism has disappeared but the state ability
to shape the future will decline too.
e) Finally, there is the question of the next
growth model. If the cyclical interpretation
holds true, we have to think about the coming
regime of accumulation. Will this still be
finance-driven or will we enter a new period? On
the one hand there are a lot of indications that
the crisis has lost its power and that the econo-
my is in a process of recovery. But, on the other
hand, there are discussions that severe effects
of the bubble are not yet clear, like the CMBS
and the growing debt problem right now. A
crisis-driven development with all its instabil-
ities might be a realistic vision for the next few
years leading to exceptional politics and fur-
ther democratic weaknesses. Furthermore new
accumulation models are not in sight or are still
not so powerful that a new structural coherence
might derive from it. This includes the vision
of ‘green capitalism’. But this question is not
primarily an academic issue but one of politi-
cal debate, social struggles and innovations. In
retrospect we know that capitalism is able to re-
produce itself in new and unexpected forms
but, as has been outlined above, the concrete
forms are a result of social struggles and
political power relationships.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that the time since
2007/08 may be characterised as a global crisis
with qualities of a format which may be com-
pared with the world economic crisis in 1928
and the so-called crisis of Fordism in the late
sixties/early seventies of the last century. In these
crises, capitalist economies not only passed
through major economic disturbances but trans-
formed themselves in a fundamental way. The
politics of the ‘new deal’ in the USA introduced
a Keynesian style to regulate economic process-
es leading to the different forms of Fordism af-
ter World War II. The crisis of Fordism in 1970s,
in turn, led to a neoliberal version of the econo-
my and society in which market organisation was
seen as the most effective and promising way for
ensuring economic growth and general welfare.
During the eighties and nineties a finance-
dominated accumulation regime emerged as the
structuring power of the world economy.
If it is appropriate to adopt an interpretation of
economic processes which distinguishes be-
tween periods of structural stability (including
minor crisis phenomena) and times of interrup-
tions and deep-rooted changes, the historical
dimensions of recent events indicate the end or
at least a fundamental transformation of global
neoliberalism and the undisputed US hegemo-
ny. This includes further spatialities of the cri-
sis like spatial disparities and forms of uneven
development on the global scale where old geo-
economic patterns persist and new ones evolve,
e.g., in the role of financial centres or in the in-
terdependencies between the US and China and
other rising economies respectively (French et al.
2009, Zeller 2011). This research, which is often
combined with discussions about varieties of capi-
talism, with a certain concentration on the Anglo-
American neoliberal model (French et al. 2011,
Pike and Pollard 2010), has to be carried on and
expanded. Beside the ongoing reception of influ-
ential work like Harvey’s (2011) with a strong
Marxist position or the more heterodox concept
of ‘variegated capitalism’ by Peck et al. (2010) or
Dixon (2011), it should be recommended here to
make more use of actor-network theory and gov-
ernmentality studies in order to follow the causes
and effects of the credit crunch in everyday life
(Langley 2008, MacKenzie 2011).
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In the immediate future, crisis management will
dominate, leading to institutional innovations
and change. These transformations will prepare
a platform of a new accumulation regime. As we
could observe in the past, such times are strongly
affecting our thinking about political, social and
economic geographies in at least two directions:
as impulse to think about new or advanced theo-
retical approaches about the meaning of the cri-
sis, and as a call to point out inherent inequali-
ties and injustices. In this sense the crisis offers
a challenge to rethink Human Geography.
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Summary: The Economic Crisis and the Reshaping
of Geography
The years since 2007/08 may be characterised as a
global crisis comparable with the world economic
crisis in 1928 and the so-called crisis of Fordism in the
late sixties/early seventies of the last century. At that
time, capitalist economies not only passed through
major economic disturbances but transformed them-
selves in a fundamental way leading to the ‘new deal’
or, later, to different forms of Fordism. During the
eighties and nineties of the last century a finance-
dominated accumulation regime emerged as the struc-
turing power of the world economy. Financialisation
has become a process which has not only led to new
forms of “shareholder value management”, but also to
an autonomous financial sector with enormous growth
patterns. Furthermore financialisation is penetrating
everyday life leading to growing dependencies of
ordinary households to global financial markets and
disturbances. A spatialised perspective at the fi-
nance-driven accumulation regime draws attention to
the mortgage crisis as part of the urban roots of the
recent financial crisis. Focusing on US experiences
one can observe the ways the production of space is
both a driver for and an object of financialisation
processes. Though the geography of the finance crisis
is still in a juvenile state, the urban perspectives allow
us to outline some heterodox building blocks which
might be helpful to get a better understanding of recent
events. Finally, this exercise leads to several future
research tasks and demands to write about the crisis
in the form of “near-event description” which is seen
as appropriate because the events are still unfolding.
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Zusammenfassung: Die Wirtschaftskrise und die
Umgestaltung der Geographie
Die Zeit seit 2007/08 lässt sich als globale Krise charak-
terisieren, die vergleichbar mit der Weltwirtschaftskrise
1928 und der sogenannten Fordismuskrise der späten
sechziger und frühen siebziger Jahre des letzten Jahr-
hunderts anzusehen ist. In jenen Zeiten durchlief die
kapitalistische Wirtschaft nicht nur grundlegende Er-
schütterungen sondern transformierte sich in weitrei-
chender Form beispielsweise durch den „new deal“
oder in verschiedenen Formen fordistischer Akkumula-
tion und Regulation. Während der achtziger und neunzi-
ger Jahre entwickelte sich dann ein finanzdominiertes
Akkumulationsregime als strukturierende Kraft der
Weltwirtschaft. Finanzialisierung ist seitdem zu einem
Prozess geworden, der nicht nur neue Formen der
Unternehmensorganisation nach dem Muster des “share-
holder value management” erzeugt hat, sondern auch
zu einem autonomen Sektor der Finanzwirtschaft geführt
hat, der sich durch enorme Wachstumsraten auszeich-
net. Weiterhin penetrieren Finanzialisierungsprozesse
das Alltagsleben und haben eine sich verstärkende
Abhängigkeit der Privatpersonen und Haushalte von
Entwicklungen auf den Weltfinanzmärkten erzeugt. Eine
räumliche Perspektive der Finanzkrise lässt sich durch
Beobachtungen der US-amerikanischen Hypotheken-
krise herleiten, die einen wesentlichen Bestandteil der in
dem Beitrag in den Vordergrund gestellten städtischen
Ursachen der Krise darstellt. Damit wird de Hypothese
aufgenommen und vertieft, die Produktion von urbanem
Raum sei gleichzeitig Antriebsfaktor und Ergebnis der
Finanzkrise. Obwohl der generelle Zustand der Finanzge-
ographie noch als sehr jung und unvollkommen bezeichnet
werden muss, ergibt die urbane Perspektive einige kon-
zeptionelle Bausteine, die hilfreich sind, die gegenwärtige
Krise zu verstehen. Schließlich werden diese Einsichten
genutzt, um einige zukünftige Untersuchungsaufgaben zu
formulieren. Zunächst sind beschreibende Aufgaben, die
krisennah umgesetzt werden sollten, vorzuziehen, da sich
das Krisengeschehen nach wie vor entfaltet.
Résumé: La crise économique et le remodelage de
la géographie
Depuis les années 2007/08, l’économie mondiale fait
face à une crise comparable à celle de l’année 1928
et à celle de la fin des années soixante et du début des
années soixante-dix, dite la crise du fordisme. L’éco-
nomie capitaliste parcourait à ces époques non seu-
lement des bouleversements profonds, mais se trans-
formait aussi de longue portée, dû par exemple au «
new deal » ou aux régimes différents d’accumula-
tion et des régulations fordistes. Pendant les années
quatre-vingt et quatre-vingt-dix, un régime d’accu-
mulation dominé par les finances se développait com-
me force structurante de l’économie mondiale. De-
venu le processus, la financiarisation dès lors n’eut
pas seulement produit de nouvelles formes d’organi-
sations d’entreprises, selon le modèle des « share-
holder value management », mais eut aussi pour
résultat un secteur autonome de l’économie financiè-
re, qui se détermine par ses taux de croissance
considérables. Pénétrant la vie quotidienne, les pro-
cessus de financiarisation suscitent dès lors une
dépendance croissante des personnes privées et des
foyers envers les développements sur les marchés
financières du monde. Un aspect spatial s’en  déduit
en observant la crise des hypothèques aux États-Unis,
qui à sa tour représente un élément essentiel des
causes urbaines de la crise mises au premier plan ici.
En conséquence, l’article se penche sur l’hypothèse
que la production d’espace urbain soit en même
temps moteur et résultat de la crise financière. La
géographie financière est une science encore très
jeune. Néanmoins,  la perspective urbaine offre quel-
ques éléments conceptionnels qui améliorent la com-
préhension de  la crise financière actuelle. Les résul-
tats obtenus ainsi peuvent être utilisés pour formuler
de nouvelles hypothèses de travail. Face à cette crise
financière, qui n’a toujours pas cessé de s’étendre,
des tâches descriptives, qui seront dès aujourd’hui
réalisables, sont à favoriser.
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